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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
In addition to those parties named in the caption on 
appealr the parties in the lower court included: 
1. Robert Busch 
2. Ronald Coulam 
3. Melvin Jensen 
4. The partnership of Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
and John Webster 
5. Commercial Security Bank 
These parties were all dismissed on Summary Judgment. 
Their dismissals are not challenged. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of this court is conferred by Utah 
Code Ann. §28-2a-3(2)(j) as granted to this court by order of 
the Utah Supreme Court dated July 7, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND ISSUES 
This is a suit by an attorney for the recovery of 
attorney fees. The plaintiff/appellant (hereafter referred 
to as DeBry) seeks attorney fees based on the contract rate 
of $50 per hour. In the alternative, DeBry seeks a 
reasonable fee based upon quantum meruit. 
The client was the Graystone Pines Homeowner's 
Association (hereafter referred to as Graystone). Graystone 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment to put an 
artificial lid on DeBry's recovery. The lower court granted 
this motion without explanation and refused to reconsider or 
clarify its ruling- (R. 1294, 1298)(attached as Exhibits A 
and B.) By stipulation of the parties, the Order became a 
final judgment. (R. 1841, 1858.) DeBry appeals. 
The only issue in this case is the amount of the fee. 
Specifically, whether DeBry should be paid at a contingent 
rate of 30%; or should DeBry be paid at a rate of $50 per 
hour. 
FACTS 
The Agreements 
1. Graystone originally agreed to pay DeBry $50 per 
hour. This is substantially below DeBry's normal hourly 
rate. (R. 000145 attached as Exhibit C hereto.) 
2. After the litigation became more expensive than 
either party had anticipated, Graystone asked D€>Bry to change 
to a contingent fee. DeBry did not initiate the change, but 
simply responded to Graystoners request. DeBry agreed to 
continue the employment on a 30% contingency "only" if he 
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"had complete and unfettered control over any settlement." 
DeBry further stated that if the contingent arrangement "is 
for any reason unworkable, I would continue to work on an 
hourly basis-" R. 000147, attached as Exhibit D hereto.) 
3. Up to the time of the amendment, DeBry had 
received slightly over $15,000 from Graystone. However, 
about $10,000 of that amount was for reimbursement for out-
of-pocket costs. (R. 001343.) 
4. In the underlying case, Graystone received a 
settlement offer of $61,000. DeBry advised Graystone not to 
settle for that amount but to stand firm and wait for a 
higher offer, (R. 001663, attached as Exhibit E hereto.) 
5. Graystone told DeBry that their desire to settle 
had nothing to do with the merits. DeBry was told that 
Graystone was simply tired of litigating and that they wanted 
to avoid further emotional strain. Therefore, the case was 
settled for $61,000 against DeBry's recommendation. (R. 
000153 attached as Exhibit F hereto.) 
6. Before Graystone accepted the $61,000 
settlement, DeBry informed them, orally and in writing, that 
they had the power to settle without his consent but that his 
fee would be set at $50 per hour (instead of the 30% 
contingent fee) if they settled against his advice. (R. 
001663 attached as Exhibit E hereto.) 
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1. If the attorney's fee is computed on the basis 
of the original contract ($50 per hour), DeBry would get a 
fee of $31,300. (R. 000168.) However, if the attorney's 
fee is computed on the basis of the amended contract (30% 
contingency), DeBry would get a fee of only $18,300. Thus, 
on the contingent fee basis, DeBry's fee would work out to be 
less than $30 per hour. (R. 001296.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Graystone breached a condition of the amended 
contract. Because of Graystone's breach, that amendment 
fails and the parties revert to the original contract. 
The condition in the amended contract giving DeBry 
"unfettered control over any settlement" is not void against 
public policy. Even if it were, it is not severable from the 
remainder of the amended contract. That amendment, 
therefore, fails and the parties must stand on their original 
contract. 
If the entire contract fails, then the parties are 
relegated to quantum meruit and DeBry's fee must be set 
according to the reasonable value of his services. This 
cannot be determined in a summary proceeding, but requires 
an evidentiary hearing. 
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The trial court cannot re-write the contract between 
the parties. Relief must be found within the four corners of 
the contract and the court cannot fashion remedies not 
contemplated by the parties. 
The amended fee contract was negotiated between the 
parties based upon an exaggerated value of the case. 
Graystone fraudulently represented the value of the case and 
should not be allowed to benefit by its fraud* 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE GRAYSTONE BREACHED 
A CONDITION OF THE AMENDED 
CONTRACT, THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES 
ARE GOVERNED BY THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT 
The- original contract provided an attorney's fee of 
$50 per hour. Later, the parties bargained to change to a 
contingent fee of 30%. However, there was a condition for 
the amendment. The condition was that: 
I would accept the contingent fee only 
if I had complete and unfettered control over 
any settlement. 
If the contingent fee proposal is for 
any "reason unworkable, I would continue to 
work on an hourly basis. 
(See generally Fact Section, above.) 
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It is undisputed that the condition was breached. 
Graystone wanted to accept a settlement offer of $61,000. 
DeBry vigorously recommended against that settlement. 
However, Graystone proceeded to close the settlement at 
$61,000. (R. 001009.) (See also Exhibit F attached.) 
Because the condition was breached, the amendment 
(for a 30% contingent fee) also failed. What remains is the 
original contract for $50 per hour. Thus, DeBry's fee should 
be set at $50 per hour as a matter of law. 
POINT TWO 
THE CONDITION WAS NOT 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 
In the trial court, Graystone attacked the condition1 
on grounds of public policy. Graystone argued that an 
attorney cannot restrict a client's right to settle. (R. 
000993. ) 
The condition was: 
I would accept the contingent fee only if I 
had complete and unfettered control over any 
settlement. (R. 000148.) 
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However, this type of fee contract is not uncommon. 
Indeed, the leading treatise in the field includes a form 
outlining just such an arrangement. Speiser, Attorney Fees, 
§4:51 Form No. 17. (See Exhibit G hereto.) 
Such agreements have been upheld by courts. Ward v. 
Orsini, 152 N.E. 696 (N.Y. 1926). (Attached as Exhibit H 
hereto.) See also Lundskoy v. Conrad Seipp Brewing Co., 187 
111. App. 180 (1914); 7A C.J.S. - Attorney and Client, §317 
Notes 19 and 20. 
POINT THREE 
IF THE CONDITION IS VOID AS 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, THE ENTIRE 
AMENDMENT MUST BE SEVERED AND THE RIGHTS 
OF THE PARTIES WOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT 
Graystone's central argument, below, was that the 
condition^ was void as against public policy. (R. 000993.) 
However, it must be stressed that the condition is completely 
intertwined with the substance of the amendment: 
I would accept the contingent fee only if I 
had complete and unfettered control over any 
settlement. (R. 000148.) 
The doctrine of severability allows certain invalid 
provisions to be separated from valid ones. But the doctrine 
^For text of the condition, see fn. 1, above. 
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only applies if the invalid feature can be eliminated without 
impairing the basic intent of the contract as a whole. Where 
the valid and invalid parts are so interwoven that they 
cannot be separated without destroying the general meaning 
and purpose of the agreement, the interconnected parts must 
be deleted as well. In Re: Snyder, 82 N.E.742 (N.Y. 1907); 
Cummings v. Patterson, 442 S.W.2d 640 (Tenn. App. 1968); 
Davis v. Webber, 49 S.W. 822 (Ark. 1899). 
Since the condition (DeBry to control settlement 
negotiations) is intertwined with the substance of the 
amendment (to change fee from $50 per hour to 30%), it is not 
possible to sever. Therefore, if the condition is void, the 
entire amendment must fall. 
However, even though the amendment (for 30%) might 
fall, the original contract (for $50 per hour) is still 
intact and valid. See Carter v. Rich's, Inc., 63 S.E.2d 241 
(Ga. App. 1951); Bakke v. Buck, 587 P.2d 575 (Wash. App. 
1978); Hunter v. Benamy, 115 S.E.2d 424 (Ga. App. 1960); 
Langlois v. Maloney, 64 A.2d 697 (N.H. 1949). Or stated in 
other words, the condition (viz. DeBry to control settlement 
negotiations) is intertwined with the substance of the 
amendment (viz. to change the rate from $50 per hour to 30%). 
However, the condition (viz. DeBry to control settlement 
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negotiations) is not intertwined with the original contract 
(viz- contract rate to be $50 per hour.) 
POINT FOUR 
IF THE CONDITION IS VOID, 
BUT NOT SEVERABLE, THE ENTIRE 
AGREEMENT WOULD FALL AND A TRIAL 
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SET A FEE IN QUANTUM MERUIT 
In Point Three, above, DeBry argues that an invalid 
condition (DeBry to have control over settlement 
negotiations) would nullify the entire amendment (30% 
contingent fee) while leaving the original fee agreement ($50 
per hour) intact. 
It is theoretically possible that an invalid 
condition (DeBry to have control over the settlement 
negotiations) would nullify both the amendment (30% 
contingent fee) and the original contract ($50 per hour). In 
that case, there would be no contract at all, and the fee 
would be set by quantum meruit. In Mattioni, Mattioni & 
Mattioni v. Ecological Shipping, 530 F.Supp. 910 (E.D. Penn. 
1981); In Re: Snyder, 82 N.E. 742 (1907); Cummings v. 
Patterson, 442 S.W.2d 640 (Penn. App. 1969); Davis v. 
Webber, 49 S.W. 822 (Ark. 1899). 
An attorney's entitlement under quantum meruit can 
only be determined after an evidentiary hearing. Smith v. 
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Westside Transit Lines, Inc., 313 So.2d 371 (La.App. 1975); 
and requires the presentation of evidence by the attorney 
seeking recovery. Mercy Hospital v. Johnson, 431 So.2d 687 
(Fla. App. 1983) . 
Many factors must be considered including the number 
of hours spent, the amount of the claim, the attorney's 
reputation and experience and the benefit to the client. The 
existence of a contingency agreement is only one such factor. 
Baker v. City of Granite, 446 N.E.2d 531 (111.App. 1983); 
Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 443 F.2d 896 (CA5 1971). 
It is not a question that can be resolved in a summary 
proceeding. Levy v. Public Service Ry. Co., 103 A. 171 (N.J. 
1918) . 
The trial court clearly erred in failing to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the value of services provided by 
DeBry and the fee to which he was entitled. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO 
POWER TO TOTALLY REWRITE 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
This case involves two separate fee agreements: the 
first fee agreement was for $50 per hour. Later, the parties 
amended the fee to be a 30% contingency. However, the later 
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amendment was based upon a specific condition that DeBry 
would control all settlement negotiations. (See fn. 1, 
above.) This history can be set forth in schematic form as 
follows: 
Later amendment changing fee 
to 30% contingency. 
Condition that 
DeBry to have 
complete control 
over any settlement. 
Original contract for 
$50 per hour. 
Thusf the trial court judge had three alternative: 
1. The court could have enforced the condition. 
Since DeBry did not control the settlement negotiations, he 
would be paid at $50 per hour. (See Point One, above.) 
2. The court could have declared the amendment to 
be invalid but severable from the original contract. In that 
case the entire amendment would fall. The parties would 
revert to the original contract which remains intact at $50 
per hour. (See Point III, above.) 
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3. The court could have declared the condition as 
void or invalid, but not severable, in which case the entire 
contract (original contract plus amendment) would fall and 
the parties would revert to quantum meruit. (See Point Four, 
above.) 
However, the trial court did none of the above. 
Rather, the court tried for a middle ground. The trial court 
enforced the amendment (30% contingent fee); but the trial 
court did not enforce the related condition (DeBry to control 
settlement negotiations). Or in other words, the court 
declared that the condition (DeBry to control the settlement 
negotiations) would not be enforced; but the revised fee (30% 
contingency) would be enforced. In so doing, the court 
simply created a new contract for the parties. 
In a variety of different contexts, the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that courts cannot totally rewrite the 
contract between the parties. In a case involving a 
forfeiture provision in a real estate contract, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that, 
[P]ersons dealing at arms length are entitled 
to contract or their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts of the purposes 
of relieving one side or the other from the 
effect of a bid bargain. 
Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah 1978). 
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Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982) involved a situation where one party 
attempted to impose an implied contractual provision- The 
Utah Supreme court stated: 
[I]t is not for a court to rewrite a 
contract improvidently entered into at arm's 
length or to change the bargain indirectly on 
the basis of supposed equitable principles. 
(657 P.2d at 749-) 
Since the trial court had no power to create a new 
contract, it should have awarded DeBry $50 per hour under the 
original contract; or a trial should have been held to 
establish quantum meruit. 
POINT SIX 
THE AMENDED FEE CONTRACT, 
WITH ITS CONDITION, WAS INDUCED BY FRAUD 
When an attorney bargains for a contingent fee, it is 
customary to assess the total potential recovery. For 
example, 30% of $1,000,000 would be a very handsome fee, 
while 30% of $1,000 may not be worth a lawyer's time on a 
contingent fee case. 
In measuring the potential recovery, DeBry was 
particularly interested in the cost of repairing a so-called 
"black substance" defect. Graystone got a written bid of 
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$78,000, to repair the "black substance" problem. That bid 
was presented to DeBry by Graystone. (R. 001544.) However, 
the $78,000 bid was simply a fabrication. (R. 001827.) The 
false bid was prepared at the direct request of the Graystone 
president. The true cost of doing the repair was less than 
$10,000. (R. 001827.) 
DeBry had a clear right to terminate the contract 
based on Graystone's fraud. Gebhardt v. United Railway Co., 
220 S.W. 667 (Mo. 1920); Clark v. Nichols, 111 N.Y.S. 66 
(1908). If DeBry had voluntarily withdrawn, he would still 
have been entitled to a fee for work done. Ambrose v. 
Detroit Edison Co., 237 N.W.2d 520, 88 A.L.R.3d 239. 
However, DeBry did not learn of the trickery until a few days 
before the trial. At that late date numerous witnesses were 
subpoenaed, and expert witnessed had been paid. Moreover, 
DeBry reasoned that there were many homeowners at Graystone 
who knew nothing of the trickery. Therefore, DeBry felt 
compelled to continue the employment. (R. 001663.) 
If DeBry had known the true facts he would not have 
entered into the contingent fee agreement. Or in the 
alternative, if DeBry had known the true facts at an earlier 
time, he would have withdrawn from the contingent fee 
contract. (R. 001663.) 
14 
Graystone's trickery will be rewarded if this court 
now enforces the contingent fee agreement. Rather, this 
court should construe the contingent fee agreement as an 
attempted modification which failed because of Graystone's 
fraud. Since the attempted modification has failed, the 
original contract should remain as the controlling agreement 
between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
DeBry and Graystone contemplated a contract based 
upon an expected value of the case. An integral part of that 
agreement was that DeBry would have control over settlement 
negotiations. This condition was not in violation of public 
policy and is a valid condition of the contract. That 
condition has been broken by Graystone and, therefore, the 
amended contract fails leaving the parties to rely on their 
original agreement. DeBry is, therefore, entitled to 
attorney fees at the rate of $50 per hour. 
Even if the condition governing control of settlement 
is void against public policy, it is not severable from the 
remainder of the agreement. DeBry agreed to a contingency 
fee on the express condition that he have control of 
settlement. Without control, there was no intent for a 
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contingent fee contract. The amended agreement, therefore, 
fails leaving the parties to rely upon the $50 per hour 
contract. 
At the very least, the entire contract fails and the 
relationship of the parties is governed by quantum meruit. 
Under quantum meruit, DeBry is entitled to the reasonable 
value of his services. The reasonable value can only be 
determined after an evidentiary hearing at which DeBry 
submits evidence of the time expended and the benefit to the 
client. It was improper for the court to attempt to re-write 
the contract between the parties and the matter should be 
remanded to the court for a hearing to determine the proper 
amount of fees based either upon the $50 per hour contract or 
quantum meruit. 
DATED this ftf day of > T t ? 6 ^ ^ 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By:^ 
^TO 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH ; 
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN 
JENSEN; the partnership 
Of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU, JOHN WEBSTER; and 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
Defendants , 
vs. 
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON, 
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS 
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE 
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS 
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on 
behalf of the owners of all 
the units in the Graystone 
Pines Condominiums, 
Intervenors and 
Counter-Plaintiffs 
ORDER GRANTING GRAYSTONE 
PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION AND 
INTERVENORS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-5167 
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Defendant Graystone Pines Homeowners Association's and 
Intervenors1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue 
of the maximum amount of attorney's fees which may be 
recovered by plaintiff came on regularly for hearing on March 
11, 1986, at the hour of 8:00 a.m. Thomas R. Vuksinick 
appeared for the defendant Homeowners Association and the 
Interventors and David M. Jorgensen of Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates appeared for plaintiff Robert DeBry. The Court 
having heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the 
memoranda, exhibits and affidavits on file, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
defendant Homeowners Association and Intervenors' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment be and is hereby granted, the Court 
finding that there exists no genuine issue of material fact 
precluding the granting of said Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and that as a matter of law defendant Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Association and the Interveners are entitled 
to partial summary judgment limiting plaintiff's recovery on 
his claim for attorney's fees for services rendered with 
respect to Graystone Pines Home Owners Association v. Bush, 
et. al, Civil No. C-79-763, to a maximum of 30% (the agreed 
contingent fee percentage) of the sum ($61,000) for which 
said action was settled; and accordingly, judgment is hereby 
granted that plaintiff's recovery on his claim for attorney's 
1 
2 
3 
4 
fees shall not exceed the sum of $18,300 plus any 
unreimbursed costs plaintiff may prove he has incurred in 
said action. 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
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The Honorable Raymond S* Uno 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING GRAYSTONE PINES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AND INTERVENORS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this }nfl{ day of March, 
1986, to the following: 
Stephen Roth, Esq. 
Bruce R. Garner, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
H. Wayne Wadsworth, Esq. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert J. DeBry, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey W. Shields, Esq. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
ikUW'L 
EXHIBIT B 
Randall S. Feil 1052 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 3341 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
American Plaza II 
P.O. Box 3450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Intervenors 
and Counter-Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
and 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH ; 
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN 
JENSEN; the partnership 
of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU, JOHN WEBSTER; 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
Defendants , 
vs. 
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON, 
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS 
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE 
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS 
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on 
behalf of the owners of all 
the units in the Graystone 
Pines Condominiums, 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF 
ORDER OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Civil No. C83-5167 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Intervenors and 
Counter-Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff Robert J- DeBry's Objection to Entry of Order 
or in the Alternative Motion to Reconsider came on regularly 
for hearing on April 17, 1986 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. 
Thomas R. Vuksinick appeared for defendant Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association and the intervenors and David M. 
Jorgensen of Robert J. DeBry and Associates appeared for 
plaintiff Robert J. DeBry. The Court having heard the 
arguments of counsel and having reviewed the memoranda, 
exhibits and affidavits on file, and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's Objection to 
Entry of Order or, in the Alternative, Motion to Reconsider 
is hereby denied, the Court finding the plaintiff Robert J. 
DeBry is not entitled to recover prejudgment interest on his 
claim for attorney !s fees against the defendant Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Association and that the form of order 
granting Graystone Pines Homeowners Association and 
intervenors1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment previously 
submitted is in conformity with the Court's March 11, 1986 
ruling; and accordingly the form of judgment previously 
submitted by the Homeowners Association and intervenors shall 
be entered by the Court. 
-2-
c 
2 
3 § «o 
8 
9 
10 
l \ 
15 
16 
< 
20 
21 
J £ «o tr iv 
- O ^ U J Q 
•^  >7 °- ^ -"" 2 ]-
- J w> —' 
I * 
> rv 
> «*> 
Jj 
00 
23 
2.) 
< 26 
DATED t h i s d a y o t , 1 9 8 6 . 
BY THE COURT: 
The H o n o r a b l e Raymond S . "Uno 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
TO ENTRY OF ORDER OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER, postage prepaid, this [o/^—- day of April, 
1986, to the following: 
Stephen Roth, Esq. 
Bruce R. Garner, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
H. Wayne Wadsworth, Esq. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert J. DeBry, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT C 
\*f W ^ U " X / V ^S 
£040 (So*/ 4k900\£u^t .£*£+ 
6 0 ! 278 -4439 
November 9, 1978 
Mr. Ashby Badger, President 
Graystone Pines Owner's Assfn. 
2710 Highland Drive, #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Mr. William Keyser 
2710 Highland Drive, #10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Gentlemen: 
This will confirm our arrangement that I will 
immediately commence preliminary research and a drafting of 
the complaint and interrogatories in the Graystone Pines 
matter. In accordance with our understanding, I will charge 
$50.00 per hour. 
I am attaching herewith my initial bill of $400 
for the work done to date. I understand that you will bring 
in an initial retainer of $2500 in the near future. That 
money will be deposited in our trust account. Thereafter, 
you will receive periodic billings, and with each billing we 
will automatically withdraw the appropriate amount. 
We apparently agree that the strategy will be to 
press defendants to enter into a favorable arbitration agree-
ment. We can best accomplish that objective by hitting them 
hard with a good, solid complaint and extensive interrogatories. 
Thus, your first few billings will be relatively high. 
I am attaching a copy of the letter to the defendants, 
We are not waiting for their answer. Instead, we are pushinq 
ahead with our research and drafting of pleadings. 
Sincerely yours 
RJD/ehh 
Enclosures 
Robert J. DeBry 
EXHIBIT D 
S%/&>TTl'Cy M£ -Line 
£040 &*/ XSPCjC^tA, j/u<6 ><?J- J&&JL(< €*/y, °te*A 84JJ7 
SO I 2 7 6 - 4 4 0 9 
March 4 , 1980 
Mr. Ashby Badger 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Mr. Bill Kaiser 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Mr. John Webster 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Gentlemen: 
Re Gravstone Pines 
I appreciated the candid discussion we had about the cost of 
the present litigation. 
It is true that I initially underestimated the cost of the 
litigation. For that, I apologize. However, it is extremely 
difficutl to predict, in advance, the cost of litigation. Primarily, 
that is because we cannot know in advance how obstreperous the 
defense will be. 
Also, in reviewing the file, it appears that I made that 
estimate before I was aware that the corporation had been bankrupted 
by Busch, Coulam and Jensen. Our effort to "pierce the corporate 
veil" really doubles the expense and complexity of this litigation. 
In a sense, that is water under the bridge. However, I think 
it is fair for us all to take a lesson from that. I have estimated 
that we are about' one-half way through the expenses of this case. 
If everything goes our way, the actual cost could be substantially 
less. However, we may well buck up against unforeseen problems which 
would increase that cost. I would like to give you a more trustworthy 
figure, but I cannot; and I doubt if any other attorney can. 
Page Two 
March 4, 1980 
I have considered' your request that I continue the case on 
some sort of contingent fee. As I advised in the beginning, this 
is not the type of case which lends itself easily to a contingent fee. 
In part, that is because our original goal was simply to force the 
defendants into arbitration. 
Contingent fees generally run from 30-60% depending upon the 
complexity of the case and other factors. The typical contingent 
fee would be 33 1/3%; however, it is by no means uncommon to see 
40-50-60% contingent fees. 
I believe that few attorneys would tackle this case on a 
contingent fee. If they did so, I would suspect that a reasonable 
contingent fee for this type of case would be 60% of any recovery. 
Of course, we are about one-half way through the litigation process. 
Thus, a reasonable contingent fee to press the case from this point 
on would be 30% of any recovery. If you wish, I would finish the 
case on that basis (i.e., 30% of any recovery). You would, of course, 
have the obligation to .pay "out of pocket" expenses such as telephone, 
photocopies, witness fees, depositions, research fees, experts, etc. 
However, before you settle on a contingent fee, remember that it is 
a gamble. If we go through another 100-200 hours and lose the case, 
you obviously win the gamble. However, we might just as well enter 
into some settlement next week in which case you lose the gamble. 
One further matter on contingent fees. Clients are sometimes 
overly optimistic because they are not paying anything to their 
attorney. Thus, they may turn down reasonable settlement offers 
because it costs them nothing to gamble on the results of a trial. 
Therefore, I would accept the contingent fee only if I had complete 
and unfettered control over any settlement. 
If the contingent fee proposed is for any reason unworkable, 
I would continue to work on an hourly basis. However, I would like 
to point out one thing. When I accepted the case, I told you that 
my regular fee for litigation was $70 per hour. However, I agreed 
to take on the case for $50 per hour. Since that time I have in-
creased my regular fee for litigation to $90 per hour. I have not 
raised my fee for this case—nor do I intend to do so. However, I 
certainly cannot ^ reduce my fee in any way. 
There is one alternative which you should realistically consider. 
You might find another attorney who could handle this matter for less 
money. I would harbor no bad feelings about such an arrangement, and 
I would cooperate with your new counsel in every way. Although few 
lawyers will admit it, hiring a lawyer is much like hiring a gardner. 
The client should shop around and find someone who will do an adequate 
job at the lowest price. 
.-ax . --AShby Badge 
Mr. Bill Kaiser 
Mr. John Webster 
Page Three 
March 4, 19 30 
There is one final way in which you might hold the price down. 
As far as possible, you can provide manpower to assist with the 
necessary legwork. (I might add that you have been splendid about 
these requests so far.) Whatever work you can do saves $50 per hour. 
At the moment, I have one request pending. I have asked Bill 
Kaiser to get two blown-up photos of the microscopic study compairing 
Rockwool insulation and the "black substance" 
I can now add further requests. I am attaching a written report 
from Clawson which outlines what must be done (in his opinion) to 
repair the roof. I would like you to get about five written bids 
from reputable roofers (including Clawson) on the cost of the repairs 
he has recommended. With each bid, get a written guarante.e (e.g., 
one year or ten years, etc.). Also, ask the roofer to bid on any 
extra or alternate system which the builder might suggest to improve 
Clawson's plan. Have the roofer give a written guarantee on the 
alternative. 
Finally, I am going to need a scale model of the roof for the 
trial. The model should measure about 4f X 8f and be portable enough 
to carry into court. The model should be constructed in such detail 
that our expert can point out where the leaks occur and why. Also, 
the expert must show, on the model, why a whole new roof was necessary 
to correct the problem. Perhaps the model could be constructed in 
such a way that we could actually tear it down and show how the new 
roof looks. We can also construct full-size models of any particular 
part of the roof (e.g. corners, flashing, etc.) which contribute 
to the problem. 
Such models might cost $1,000 or so. However, that would be 
the most important part of the trial. The jury should see why the 
leaks occur. You could work with our expert to construct such models. 
Such models are generally admissible in evidence so long as they 
fairly and accurately depict the real roof. Thus, they should, so 
far as possible, be scale models down to and including the same 
materials. 
Please advise me of your response tp^ -ttra foregoing. 
Sincerely,i 
RJ D: s g 
Enc. 
Robert J . DeBry 
EXHIBIT E 
ROBERT - ' - 44 
ROBERT .:. Di'L'FV •. ASSOCIATES 
4001 South "Or p .- * , Fifth ri.or 
Salt Lake City, U~~h, 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Carmen Kipp 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
3 2 Exchange Place, £6 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(R01) ^'il-3773 
Attorn -in*iff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LA!;1., L'JllN'l1 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT 
Plaintiff, 
GRAYSTONE PINE HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH; 
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN JENSEN; 
the partnership of SNOW, 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 
and JOHN WEBSTER; and 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendants , 
vs, 
COUNTER AFF1DAV' 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO 
JOHN WEBSTER, 111.'1: NEILSON, 
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT, 
and LOUISE MALLONEE as the 
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION on behalf of tin-
owners of all units in the 
Graystone Pines Condominiums, 
Intervenors and 
Counterplaintiffs. 
CLVXI No. C83-5167 
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EXHIBIT F 
.ND DELIVERED 
•20-83 
601 262-0O13 
June 2 0 , 1983 
-. Ashby Badger 
'10 Highland Dr ive 
>artment 4 
l i t Lake C i t y , Utah 84106 
:. Bill Kaiser 
710 Highland Drive 
Dartment 10 
alt Lake City, Utah 84106 
r. John Webster 
710 Highland Drive 
partment 12 
alt Lake City, Utah 84106 
sntlemen: 
I would like to review the events of last week, 
John came by to ask my advice about making a $61,000 
ounter offer. I vigorously recommended against that plan, 
ohn apparently met with the group and received their authority 
o go ahead againsf my advice. John then delivered the counter 
ffer without my knowledge or consent. I was informed after the 
act. 
I have informed you that your conduct leaves me in an 
wkward position. I believe I would be perfectly justified in 
ithdrawing, and I told you that I would give my answer after the 
eekend. 
After due consideration I think the time before the 
rial is too short to accommodate a smooth transfer to a new 
awyer. Therefore, I will not withdraw from your case. The 
atter will be tried by my associate, Robert Hansen. 
However, I must emphasize that you must assume full 
esponsibility for going against my advice and assuming direct 
ontrol of the settlement negotiations. I am enclosing for your 
Ashby Badger 
Bill Kaiser 
John Webster 
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M^UL 
FOR 
review a copy of our letter to you of March 4, 1980. You will 
notice that a condition of the contingent fee agreement was that 
I should have full control of all settlement negotiations. 
Since 
Robert J. DeB 
RJDrsg 
Enc. 
EXHIBIT G 
FACTORS AFFECTING COMPENSATION §4:51 
means of litigation, compromise, settlement, verdict or otherwise, in 
addition to all taxable costs and disbursements.85 
AND the undersigned hereby further agree not to make any compro-
mise or settlement without the written consent of said attorney. 
THIS AGREEMENT to be binding upon the heirs, executors and 
representatives of the undersigned. 
Dated at _ 8 this _ 9 day of _ 1 0 , 19-11-. 
_
1 2
 L.S. _ 1 3 
Signature Address 
_
1 4
 L.S. _ 1 5 
Signature Address 
_« L.S. _ 1 7 
Signature Address 
Practice Pointers: 
You can agree on a percentage fee to be paid in the event of a 
settlement or compromise without your consent.86 
Form No. 17 
Contingent Fee Contract with Provision Prohibiting 
Compromise or Settlement by Client, and for Payment in 
Event of Compromise Without Attorney's Consent 
I, l , hereby retain John Lawyer to make an investigation of, 
and represent me on my claims for injuries I received in an accident 
which occurred on 2 , at or near 3 For the services of 
said John Lawyer I hereby agree to pay him as fees 25 per cent of the 
gross amount paid in settlement of said claim or cause of action before 
any testimony shall be taken, or before the case shall be placed upon 
the "Ready Calendar"; 35 per cent of the gross amount paid in 
settlement of said claim or cause of action after any testimony shall be 
taken, or after the case shall be placed upon the "Ready Calendar", or 
shall be tried; and if an appeal shall be taken, or a new trial shall be 
had, by any party thereto, 45 per cent of the gross amount received in 
such settlement or litigation, in addition to the taxable costs, disburse-
ments, and expenses advanced by him on my behalf. 
I further agree that if said claim or cause of action shall be compro-
mised or settled by me without the written consent of said John 
Lawyer, then, and in such event, I shall pay him 50 per cent of the 
amount of any such compromise or settlement; and if, by the terms of 
such compromise or settlement, it shall be provided or agreed by the 
party making the same that such party will pay for my attorney's 
services, then I agree that said 50 per cent shall be computed upon the 
85. For form of provision for payment of 86. See Form No. 17, in this section, 
"expenses", see Form Nos. 12, 13, §§ 2:23, 
2:24, supra. 
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amount of the money paid to me, and the amount to be paid to said 
John Lawyer, added together, and that the sum so to be paid to John 
Lawyer shall he equal to the sum paid to me, and that John Lawyer 
shall, in addition thereto, have and receive all taxable costs, disburse-
ments, and expenses. 
I further agree that if said cause of action shall be settled by me 
without the written consent of John Lawyer after a verdict shall have 
been rendered, then the compensation of John Lawyer shall be com-
puted as if the verdict had been collected in full in accordance with the 
provisions of this contract. 
Dated: _ 4 , 19JL _ • 
Witness: 7 
I hereby accept the foregoing retainer, this 8 day of 9 , 
19_ 1 0 _ 
11 
§ 4:52. Effect of invalidity of provision against compromise 
on other provisions of contingent fee contract. 
There is a sharp conflict of authority upon the question of the 
effect of the invalidity of a stipulation against compromise by 
the client upon the enforceability of other provisions of the 
contract fixing the attorney's compensation. In some cases, in 
which this question arose, the entire contract was held to be 
vitiated.*81 However, there are a number of cases which hold that, 
if the provision in restraint of settlement or compromise of a 
case by a client is severable from the remainder of the contract, 
it will not render the entire contract invalid.88 
B. Amount of Contingent Fee Payable When Client 
Compromises Action Without Attorney's Consent 
§ 4:53. Generally. 
Where an attorney is employed under a contingent fee con-
87. Davis v Chase (1902) 159 Ind 242, 64 
NE 88, mod on other grounds 159 Ind 248, 
64 NE 853; Nichols v Waters (1918) 201 
Mich 27, 167 NW 1 (not severable); Re 
Snyder (1907) 190 NY 66, 82 NE 742 (not 
severable); Davy v Fidelity & C. Ins. Co. 
(1908) 78 Ohio St 256, 85 NE 504, affd 78 
Ohio St 441, 85 NE 1123. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 1122, 1127. 
88. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v 
Hurst (1939) 198 Ark 546, 129 SW2d 970, 
122 ALR 965; Downey v Northern P. R. 
Co. (1924) 72 Mont 166, 232 P 531; Syme v 
T^rry & T. Co. (1908) 125 App Div 610, 110 
NYS 25; Greenleaf v Minneapolis, St. P. & 
S. Ste. M. R. Co. (1915) 30 ND 112, 151 
NW 879; Howard v Ward (1913) 31 SD 114, 
139 NW 771; Potter v Ajax Min. Co. (1900) 
22 Utah 273, 61 P 999. 
In Nichols v Waters (1918) 201 Mich 27, 
167 NW 1, and Re Snyder (1907) 190 NY 
66, 82 NE 742, the entire contract was 
held invalid because the provision was not 
severable from the remainder of the con-
tract. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 1122, 1129. 
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of the witnesses. He was somewhere be-
tween the building line and the curb when 
he saw the truck 90 feet away, and proceed-
ed across the intersection until he was struck. 
The defense claimed that the plaintiff ran 
into the side of the truck. 
The main charge to t ie jury accurately 
stated in substance the law as laid down by 
us in Ward T. Clark, 232 N. Y. 195, 133 NV 
E. 443, and Shirley v. Larkin Co., 239 N. Y. 
94, 145 N. E. 751. If counsel for the plain-
tiif had left his case to the judge's charge, 
the error now complained of would not have 
occurred. 
[2] Certain requests, however, were made 
which, as we have said, must have left the 
jury in doubt as to what was meant by the 
judge in his charge, or else have given them 
a wrong impression regarding the way in 
. which they could, and should apply the above 
ordinance to the facts as they might.find 
*them. The court was requested to charge: 
"235" &r. Sees: r &$£ racer doacr Co cd&rge
 r' 
the jury that, if the jury finds, under the cir-
cum stances, at the time of this collision, and 
just before the collision, when the two vehicles 
were approaching the point of collision, the 
defendant had the right of way, if they 
determine that the defendant did have the right 
of way, then it was plaintiff's duty to stop his 
motorcycle if necessary to avoid a collision. 
"The Court: I so charge. 
"By Mr. Butler (plaintiff's counsel): In view 
of the last request of counsel, I ask your honor 
to charge the jury that, if the jury finds from' 
all the evidence that the infant plaintiff driving 
east on Belmont avenue, going at the rate of 8 
to 19 milea an hour, between the building line 
and the curb, when the truck was 90 feet 
away, going at the rate of 17 to 25 miles an 
hour, then the ordinance that vehicles to the 
right have the right of way has no application. 
**The Court: I should say so, gentlemen. 
"By Mr. Rees: Exception." 
As bearing upon the question of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence or the defend-
ant's negligence, the court eliminated alto-
gether the ordinance from the consideration 
of the jurors, if they should find that the 
plaintiff, traveling 8 or 10 miles an hour, was 
between the building line and the curb when 
the truck was 90 feet away, traveling at the 
rate of 17 to 25 miles an hour. This was 
in effect saying that under such conditions 
the plaintiff, as matter of law, had the right 
of way. Whether it were 17 or 25 miles an 
hour or 8 or 10 miles an hour might have 
made considerable difference with the jurors 
in determining the right of way, if they were 
also to consider and apply the ordinance. It 
is not the law that the ordinance has no 
application to the circumstances assumed in 
the request. The jurors were obliged to con-
sider the ordinance. It could not be elim-
inated from the case by the court as xnstitfei 
j of law merely because the vehicles weretbris 
i given distance apart. Even if the rllntnim^ 
1
 were as stated in the request, and the jpeejb 
of the truck were 25 miles an hour, and that? 
of the motorcycle 8 miles an hour, it would' 
still be for the jury to say, considering and* 
applying the ordinance, whether or not the/ 
plaintiff had the right of way under thenilr^ 
cumstances, and exercised reasonable careMT 
proceeding across Bradford street. ,.... ;$A 
[3] What we have said in the cases abopjig 
referred to indicates that the plaintiff w*p| 
not obliged to wait and give way to a vehichfc? 
coming from his right no matter how tcr | 
away it was. The limitations of the ordU? 
nance and the way in which it should be ap*T 
plied were stated by us in these cases, and 
were also fairly stated by the court in Its 
charge. However, the last thing stated to 
the jury was this erroneous request which 
cannot be considered a harmless error. 
It Js our dutf, therefore, to reverse these 
judgments and send the cases back for a new 
trial, with costs to abide the event. 
HISCOCK, C J., and POUND, McLAUGH-
LIN, ANDREWS, and LEHMAN, JJ., concur. 
CARDOZO, J., dissents and votes to affirm 
under provisions of section 106 of the Civil 
Practice Act. 
Judgments reversed, etc. 
(243 N. T. IS) 
WARD v. ORSIN! et al. 
(Court of Appeals of New Tork. June "Sr 
1926.) 
I. Attorney and client <g=»143—Attorney jmi 
client may contract as to compensation J(Jo-
j dietary Law, § 474 [Consol. Laws, c. 30]) 
Under Judiciary Law, f 474, providing that. 
compensation of attorney is governed by agree?? 
ment which is sot restrained hj law, attomtj 
and client may make own contract as to com-
pensation. • 
2. Attorney and client &==> 147 —Fairness and 
reasonableness determines validity of con-
tract, providing that attorney's compensation ^ 
shall be equal to amount received by client ; 
if client settles without attorney's consent. 
In determining validity of contracts giving 
attorney compensation equal to amount re-
ceived by client if client settles without at-
torney's consent, rule of fairness and reason* 
ableness should he applied. 
3. Attorney and client <S=>I67(2). 
$300 held not excessive compensation as 
matter of law for reputable, experienced attor-/ 
N.Y.) WARD 
(152 
ney taking personal injury case and beginning 
action. 
4. Attorney and client £»I47. 
Agreement that attorney's compensation 
equal amount received by client if client settles 
without attorney's consent would be uncon-
scionable and unenforceable if total sum to be 
paid attorney and client exceeded amount de-
manded in complaint. 
5. Attorney and client £=> 147—Contract that 
attorney's compensation equal amount re-
ceived by client If client settles without at-
torney's consent held not invalid when result 
Is reasonable because intended to safeguard 
against settlements for small sums, whereby 
attorney would be deprived of compensation. 
Contract that attorney's compensation in 
personal injury action equal amount received 
by client if client settle without attorney's con-
sent held not within condemnation of contracts 
seeking absolutely to prevent settlements with-
out attorney's consent when result is reason-
able because intended to safeguard attorney 
against settlements for small sums, whereby he 
would be deprived of compensation. 
6. Attorney and client €=147. 
Defendant settling with plaintiff and agree-
ing to pay his attorney's compensation may at-
tack plaintiff's agreement with attorney as un-
conscionable and invalid. 
7. Attorney and client €=» 147N—Agreement that 
compensation of attorney In personal injury 
action equal amount received by client if cli-
ent settled without attorney's consent held 
reasonable and valid, where client settled for 
$300. 
Agreement that compensation of attorney 
for plaintiff in personal injury action equal 
amount paid client, and that attorney have his 
taxable costs and disbursements if client set-
tle without attorney's consent, held not unrea-
sonable nor invalid, where client settled for 
^300. 
Appeal from Superior Court, Appelate Divi-
sion, Fourth Department 
Action by Hamilton Ward against Nick Or-
sini and the New York Central Railroad Com-
pany. Appeal by permission from a judgment 
of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department 
(215 App. Div. 795, 213 N. Y. S. 932), affirm-
ing a judgment of Special Term (11*5 Misc. 
Rep. 407, 211 K. Y. S! 249), in favor of plain-
tiff. Modified, and, as modified, affirmed. 
Dana L. Spring, Hamilton Ward and Julius 
A. Schreiber, all of Buffalo, for appellant 
Howard R, Sturtevant, of Buffalo, for re-
spondents. 
POUND, J. The action is brought to en-
force an attorney's lien in an action brought 
by defendant Orsini against the defendant 
New York Central Railroad Company. Plain-
tiff, relying on the Judiciary Law, section 474 
(Cons. Laws, c. 30), which provides, "The com- • 
v. ORSINI 697 
N.E.) 
pensation of an attorney or counsellor for his 
services is governed by agreement, express or 
implied, which is not restrained by law," 
made a contract with Orsini which reads as 
follows: 
"This agreement, made this 5th day of April, 
1923, by and between Nick Orsini. hereinafter 
referred to as client, of the city of , par-
ty of the first part, and Hamilton Ward, of 
the city of Buffalo, N. Y., party of the second 
part, witnesseth: 
"Whereas, the said Nick Orsini was injured 
March 12, 1923, while repairing a car con-' 
taining corn meal at the V. I. repair yard tracks 
of the N. Y. C. R. Co., and desires to employ 
an attorney to prosecute claim and cause of 
action against any person who may be respon-
sible therefor: 
"Now, therefore, the said client agrees to 
and hereby does retain the said Hamilton Ward 
to act as his attorney to prosecute his claim 
and cause of action, and agrees to pay the 6aid 
Hamilton Ward Jwenty-five per cent (255?) _ 
in case settlement is eflecffcd DeTcre" auy LeSU--
mony is taken or before the case goes upon the 
ready calendar; thirty-five per cent (35%) in 
case said cause of action is settled after any 
testimony is taken or after it goes upon the 
ready calendar or is tried; and forty-five per 
cent (45%) in case an appeal is taken, or a 
new trial had by either party, of the amount 
received or recovered in such settlement or 
litigation, in addition to the taxable costs and 
disbursements. 
*'And it is further agreed that in case said 
cause of action is settled by the first party 
without the consent of the second party, then 
and in that case the said first party agrees to 
pay said second party fifty per cent (50%) 
of the amount of such settlement and if b> the 
terms of such settlement it is agreed by the 
party making the same that they will pay 
for the services of said attorney, then it is 
agreed that such percentage shall be com-
puted on the amount of the money paid first 
party and the amount to be paid second party 
added together .and that the sum to be paid 
second party shall be equal to the sum paid 
first party, and that second party shall have in 
addition thereto his taxable costs and disburse-
ments; and it is further agreed that if the 
said cause of action is settled by the first party 
after the verdict is rendered without the con-
sent of said second party, then the compensa-
tion of the second party shall be computed as 
if the verdict had been collected in full, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this contract. 
"And it is further agreed: And the said 
Hamilton Ward agrees to act as attorney for 
said client and cause to be performed all serv-
ices necessary to prosecute said claim and 
cause of action, without any other charge for 
said service than as above set forth, no charge 
being made unless a recovery or settlement is 
had. 
"In witness whereof, the parties hereto have 
hereunto set their hands and 6eals the day and 
year first above written. 
"Nick Orsini. . [L. S.] 
"Hamilton Ward. [L. S.] 
"Hicks." 
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The railroad company on the day the sum-
mons was served made a settlement with Or-
sini without the knowledge or consent of the 
attorney, whereby it paid him $300 and 
agreed to pay Mr. Ward whatever sum it 
might be legally liable to him by reason of 
the settlement, with full knowledge of the 
terms of the contract. It then offered to pay 
the attorney 25 per cent of the amount re-
ceived by the client, together with the taxable 
costs. Mr. Ward asserted that under the 
terms of the contract he was entitled to $300, 
or an amount equal to the amount paid Or-
sini, together with $26.50 taxable costs, and 
brought this action to enforce his lien for 
that amount. 
The question is whether the agreement to 
pay that amount in the event of a settlement 
with the client without the consent of the at-
torney is legal as applied to this settlement 
The trial court held that, as an agreement be-
tween attorney and client which prohibited a 
settlement of the litigation without the con-
sent of the attorney is void as against public 
policy (Matter of Snyder, 190 N. X. 66, 82 N. 
E. 742, 14 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1101, 123 Am. St 
Rep. 533,13 Ann. Cas. 441), so this agreement 
was void because it imposed a penalty upon 
the client in case he exercised his right to set-
tle the action without the consent of his at-
torney, and thereby, in effect, deprived him of 
the control of his own case and compelled him 
to seek the consent of the attorney in order to 
make a settlement It granted judgment es-
tablishing the lien at $75 and interest togeth-
er with $25 taxable costs, amounting in all to 
$140.75. The Appellate Division unanimously 
affirmed the judgment entered on the decision 
of the trial court, but allowed an appeal to 
this court 
In Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 
1S5 N. X. 520, 78 N. B. 179, 7.Ann. Cas. 377, 
it was held that a contract of retainer giving 
the attorney 50 per cent of the recovery was 
not unconscionable as a matter of law, that 
the question was one of fact depending upon 
the character of the claim and the amount of 
services to be rendered in prosecuting it.to 
judgment and that the mere fact that the at-
torney under the agreement was to receive 
one-half does not render the agreement un-
conscionable, "unless it appears from the evi-
dence that it was induced by fraud, or, in 
view of the nature of the claim, that the com-
pensation provided for was so excessive as to 
evince a purpose on the part of the attorney to 
obtain an improper or undue advantage over 
his client" The defendant in this action in-
terposed the defense that the agreement was 
unconscionable and void, as it had a right to 
do (Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 
supra), but it offered no evidence as to the na-
ture of the claim or the value of services ren-
dered by Mr. Ward to his client The **KG 
court has made no finding that the competnm 
tion demanded by the attorney is extortfora 
ate or excessive, or out of proportion to tfcw 
value of the attorney's services. /^g§ 
[1-5] The parties were free to mnjcA^Hijg 
own contract as to compensation. The bftsiiifa 
question is whether, under all the elrfftftpi 
Stances or me oas* Mr W » H th^eby-^jS 
tained an undue advantage over his cllentfljf 
apptiecTto tbb settlement made in this ca3a 
ir-Tfle^parties mighty have agreed on tt con«j 
pensation of 50 r>er>ent. on all moneviif | | 
celved by the client and if 50 per cent was'lpa 
fair and reasonable sum for the services Te63 
dered, the contract would be upheld and *ftfl 
fnrreri Tf Jo dtffinnlt tn cnn w h y fl^y fljffereP^ 
rule than that of fairness and reasons blenejp 
should be applied when the attorney by agree-
ment with his client seeks to provide that his 
compensation shall be equal to the amount re-
ceived by the client \f th* ^ A n f «»*£le§ wifth. 
oui the attorney's consent. At the present 
standard of professional compensation $300 
would not as matter of law be excessive com-
pensation for the services of a reputable and 
experienced attorney in taking the case and 
beginning the action. It may well be that in 
a supposed case the amount received by the 
client would be so completely out of propor-
tion to the value of the attorney's services 
that it would be unconscionable as matter of 
law to permit him to enforce his contract 
Clearly, such would be the fact in a case sug-
gested by the respondent's attorney where the 
total sum to be paid to attorney and client 
would be in excess of the amount demanded 
in the complaint But we may not close our 
eyes to the fact that the agreement before us 
is for all practical purposes intended to safe-
guard the attorney against settlements for 
small sums made behind his back whereby he 
would be deprived of just compensation for 
services rendered, finrh intent when the re-
sult is reasonable, does not bring the contract 
under the condemnation of the Snyder Case. 
gnprar of ronfrnrts which seek absolutely to 
prevent settlements without the consent of the 
aftornev.Tf the prnpneod fiettfomentwere for 
a-substantial sum it would in all probability 
be negotiated under the advice and supervi-
sion of the attorney, and the cmestion^here 
presented would not arise. 
[6] As the case^>resents itself, no unjust 
burden is imposed on the client or the rail-
road. The railroad satisfied the client and 
agreed to pay his lawyer the amount due him. 
It may on its defense against the attorney's 
demand attack the agreement as unconsciona-
ble, but it is not on its face unconscionable. 
No evidence has been offered to establish the 
fact that it is unconscionable. It does not 
hinder settlements, for it is always open to 
'ERN REPORTER 
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the railroad company to defend itself from 
extortion on the part of the attorney. 
[7] The defendant places itself in the atti-
tude of refusing to pay Mr. Ward $300 for the 
services rendered by him to his client without 
regard to the value of such services. It has 
by its own attitude made this litigation neces-
sary. The client sought to protect his attor-
ney by disclosing to the defendant the terms 
of his contract The defendant does not ques-
tion the reasonableness of the fee. It ques-
tions only the manner in which the amount is 
arrived a t No claim is made that the client 
is imposed on or that the result sought by the 
attorney is inequitable. Applying the test of 
reasonableness to the settlement in question, It 
follows that Mr. Ward is entitled to recover 
the amount of his claim without regard to ab-
stractions which are inapplicable thereto. 
The judgments should be modified by pro-
viding that plaintiff have a lien for the sum 
of $325, with interest from April 10, 1923, 
and, as so modified, affirmed, with costs to 
appellant in all courts. 
HISCOCK, C. J., And CARDOZO, MC-
LAUGHLIN, CRANE, and ANDREWS, JJ., 
concur. 
LEHMAN, J., absent 
Judgment accordingly. 
(248 N. T. 130) 
DE LAURENT v. TOWNSEND. 
(Court of Appeals of New York. June 8, 
1926.) 
!. Witnesses <§=>!78(l). 
In administrator's discovery proceeding to 
recover bonds and jewelry of deceased, defend-
ant who claimed them can testify on issue of 
title in Surrogate's Court concerning transac-
tions with decedent as to which she had been 
examined by plaintiff. 
2. Witnesses £=»!75(l). 
Where administrator, in action in Supreme 
Court to recover bonds and jewelry of de-
ceased, offers in evidence defendant's testimony 
taken in discovery proceedings, defendant be-
comes competent witness to transactions with 
deceased. 
3. Witnesses £=> 178(f)—In administrator's ac-
tion in Supreme Court to recover bonds and 
jewelry of deceased, admission of defendant's 
testimony in her own behalf as to personal 
transaction with deceased held not permis-
sible because of previous discovery proceed-
ings In which defendant was examined (Code 
Civ. Proc § 2709, and section 829, now Civil 
Practice Act, § 347, re-enacted as Code Civ. 
Proc. § 2676, now Surrogate's Court Act 
[Laws 1920, c. 928] f 206). 
In administrator's action in Supreme Court. 
to recover bonds and jewelry of deceased, ad-' 
v. TOWNSEND 699 
N.E.) 
mission of defendant's testimony in her own 
behalf as to personal transaction with de-
ceased held prejudicial error, where plaintiff 
did not testify in his own behalf or examine de-
fendant at trial as to such transactions, in view 
of Code Civ. Proc. { 829, now Civil Practice 
Act, { 347, re-enacted as Code Civ. Proc. § 
2676, now Surrogate's Court Act, § 206, which 
eliminated certain provisions of former sec-
tion 2709. 
4. Appeal and error <g=>262(2). 
Direction of verdict cannot be reviewed, in 
absence of an exception. 
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Di-
vision, First Department 
Replevin by Gabriel De Laurent, as ad-
ministrator of the estate of Edward A. De 
Laurent, deceased, against Emma B. Town-
send. Judgment of the Trial Term, entered 
on a directed verdict in favor of defendant, 
was affirmed by the Appellate Division (214 
App. Div. 493, 212 N. Y. S. 377), and plaintiff 
appeals by permission. Reversed, and new 
trial granted. 
Louis H. Levin and Joseph Steinberg, both 
of New York City, for appellant. 
Edward A. Kenney and Leonard Acker, 
both of New York City, for respondent 
POUND, J. During his lifetime one Ed-
ward A. De Laurent was the owner and in 
possession of certain French and Italian 
bonds and certain jewelry. He died in 
March, 1922. Neither the bonds nor the jew-
elry were among his effects. The plaintiff 
having been appointed administrator of the 
estate, the defendant was directed to appear 
under sections 205 and 206 of the Surrogate's 
Court Act (Laws 1920, c. 928), to give infor-
mation in regard thereto: She submitted an 
answer alleging that she was entitled to the 
property in question, and was then examined. 
No further proceedings were taken before the 
surrogate, but this action was begun in the 
Supreme Court for the recovery of the prop-
erty. The issue was whether before his death 
the deceased gave the property in question 
to the defendant. On the trial, the defend-
ant testified, over objection and exception, to 
a personal transaction with the deceased, and 
to an oral gift made by him in the course of 
these transactions to her of the property in 
question and of its delivery to her. In this 
she was corroborated by her daughter, and 
three letters were offered in evidence by her 
signed by the deceased, in each of which he 
stated that at his death he gave to the de-
fendant the bonds in question and the jewel-
ry. She and her daughter also testified that 
from 1920 she had had possession of the 
bonds, and from 1921 of the jewelry. Wit-
nesses lor the plaintiff had testified, howev-
